



THE 2022 FIU CUBA POLL

HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN SOUTH FLORIDA
VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA,
CRITICAL NATIONAL ISSUES AND THE
UPCOMING ELECTIONS



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FOREWORD

First conducted in 1991, the FIU Cuba Poll is the longest-running research project tracking the opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida. The consistency of some of the responses, as well as the shift in others, provides the most complete picture of Cuban-American political attitudes over time.

This is the first FIU Cuba Poll conducted since the inauguration of President Joseph R. Biden. The characteristics of the community measured in the 2020 poll remain relatively stable in this year's poll. The community's isolationist views have softened a bit among the young and newest arrivals but in general the polls present a community that reflects the attitudes of the current administration. While there is support for family reunification, remittance and travel shifts initiated by President Biden, the overall tendency is to maintain a strong hold on the "stick" policies that promote sanctions and isolation.

Little has changed in the narrative shaping U.S./Cuba policy during the administration of President Biden. Most of the policy shifts initiated by President Trump in 2018 have remained in place for most of President Biden's first term in office. Only within the last few months have there been signs of a possible emergence of a Biden policy towards Cuba. Family reunification initiatives are the focus of the Biden policy, as well as a loosening of the flow of personal capital in the form of remittances and people to the island. Time will only tell if these tentative steps will form the basis for a more defined foreign policy posture towards Cuba.

This poll is of particular significance to the Green School, as it is the first poll undertaken without the involvement of our late Founding Dean, John F. Stack, Jr. Dean Stack embraced the poll since the creation of

the Green School. Not only did he provide generous funding for its completion, but he also offered insightful advice on its content and potential policy implications. The 2022 Poll is dedicated to his memory and to his commitment to the multidisciplinary dynamic of the Green School. We look forward to continuing his legacy.

I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the co-principal investigators, Dr. Guillermo J. Grenier and Dr. Qing Lai. Dr. Grenier has led the FIU Cuba Poll for three decades, keeping his finger on the pulse of the public opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida. Dr. Lai joined the project in 2020 and we appreciate his contributions. We would also like to acknowledge the collaboration of staff members of the Green School, especially Amy Ellis and Jeanette Garcia Montes. And a very special thanks to the Cuban Research Institute and its Director, Dr. Jorge Duany, for continued support and co-sponsorship of the poll.

Shlomi Dinar
Interim Dean

**Steven J. Green School of International & Public
Affairs**

THE POLLSTERS



Guillermo J. Grenier is a professor of sociology in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies. Born in Havana, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis and has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation and Cuban-American ideological profiles. His books include *A History of Little Havana*, with Corinna J. Moebius (2015); *This Land Is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami*, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro and Marvin Dunn (2003); *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States*, with Lisandro Pérez (2002); *Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy*, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (1994); and *Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change*, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a faculty fellow of the University of Notre Dame's Institute of Latino Research and the director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.



Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan, where he received training at the Institute for Social Research's Population Studies Center and Survey Research Center. His research interests include Chinese Muslims, development, Cuban studies, demography and survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed articles in *Social Science Research*, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *Chinese Sociological Review*, *Chinese Journal of Sociology*, *Research in the Sociology of Work*, *Natural Hazards*, and *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)*. He joined the FIU Cuba Poll project in 2020 as co-PI. His research focuses on the Muslim population in China. He analyzes census and survey data to examine Chinese Muslims' population heterogeneity and their relations with the majority Han society, the Chinese State, and the Islamic world. He has participated in survey projects on various Asian Muslim communities, including the Xidaotang Islamic sect in Gansu, Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, and the Dungan Muslims in Central Asia.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida give President Biden poor marks for his handling of key issues facing the country. President Biden received majority approval from the entire community only on his handling of the Covid crisis. On other issues (Cuba, Russia, China, Ukraine, and the economy), different segments of Cuban Americans differed only in the degree of disapproval of the president's performance. The president finds majority support only among registered Democrats and new arrivals. A majority of new arrivals (2015-2022) support his handling of Cuba policy, Russia policy, and China policy and rate his overall performance extremely favorably (64% favorable). (Figures 25-30)
2. While his national approval rating places President Biden in the company of most previous presidents going into the midterm elections (42.7% according to pollsters at FiveThirtyEight as of this writing), only 32% of Cuban Americans give President Biden a positive job approval rating. (Figure 31)
3. The Republican Party maintains a slight majority among registered voters (52%) and is receiving new blood from most recent arrivals. Fifty four percent of registered voters who arrived since 2015 report registering as Republicans. (Figure 33)
4. It is expected that Republican Congressional candidates on the ballot in November will receive strong support from Cuban Americans. Fifty-two percent of the voters who have made a decision report that they will cast a vote for the Republican candidate on the ballot in their district. (Figure 36)
5. It is expected that Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis will receive approximately 64% of the Cuban-American vote. Only the Cuban Americans not born in Cuba express less than majority support for the governor (44%). (Figure 35)
6. It is expected that Sen. Marco Rubio will receive approximately 64% of the Cuban-American vote but he also is expected to receive support from less than half of the non-Cuban-born cohort (45%). (Figure 37)
7. Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida support the continuation of the embargo. (Figure 5)
8. Support for some policies requiring engagement remains relatively high, such as the selling of food (64% support) and medicine to the island (72% support), and the resumption of airline travel to all regions of the island (71% support). (Figures 6, 7, and 17)
9. Cuban Americans overwhelmingly support the resumption of the Family Reunification Parole Program (92%). (Figure 13)
10. The economy, health care, and immigration are the three most important issues facing Cuban Americans today, as they rank their priorities on a scale from 1-5. These are the top three issues across all cohorts even as they may shift in priority. Health care is ranked first in importance by the oldest cohort, the newest arrivals, and Democrats. Cuba policy, gun control and abortion rights shift in importance according to specific cohorts. Gun control, for example, is rated as the third most important issue by Democrats, fourth most important by the newest arrivals and third most important by the oldest cohort. (Figures 22-24)



MAIN FINDINGS

This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 3.

Cuban Americans and U.S./Cuba Relations

The Biden administration has been slow in differentiating its approach to U.S./Cuba relations from the isolationist vision implemented by President Donald Trump. A recalibration of sorts seems to be occurring as we complete this version of the FIU Cuba Poll. In May 2022, the United States announced the resumption of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) program, which was established in 2007 and suspended during the Trump years, as well as the resumption of visa granting services “on a limited basis” at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. In the same May announcement, Biden lifted some of the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed by Trump. On Sept. 21, 2022, the website of the U.S. Embassy announced that “beginning in early 2023, the U.S. Embassy in Havana will resume full immigrant visa processing for the first time since 2017.” These limited initiatives, all of which had been fully operational before the Trump era, took place after an extensive internal review. While diplomatic relations remain firmly in place, diplomacy has resumed on a slow-motion basis.

The reduction of consular activities at the United States Embassy in Havana had a dramatic effect on Cuban migration to the United States. Nearly 198,000 Cubans have entered the United States through its southwestern border so far this fiscal year (2022) after risking the overland trek from Central and South America. Most are fleeing the effects of a crumbling economy. The Cuban government’s heavy-handed approach to quelling discontent has contributed to politicizing the migration flow, as well as facilitating the reluctance of the Biden administration to enact policies promoting engagement.

This migration is having an impact on the socio-political environment in South Florida as newer Cubans, resentful of their former government, find a semblance of solace in the hardline rhetoric of the Republican Party and the strident voices of the social media influencers, many of whom are themselves newcomers and have been shaped by the last years of deprivation and crisis on the island.


It is in this climate that our respondents expressed their views in this 2022 edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. The main findings of the poll follow.

In this brief report, we present the sample distributions of selected variables, as well as their conditional distributions by age, migration/nativity, and voter registration/party. All results are weighted to represent the current (2022) Cuban-American population, ages 18 and older in Miami-Dade County. In the brief discussions associated with the charts, we sometimes highlight the opinions expressed by the entire sample and mention categories that diverge from the general opinion of the community overall. The Cuban-American community is not monolithic in its attitudes, even when certain tendencies might dominate.

Contextualizing the Cuban-American Population in South Florida

Most Cuban Americans in the United States live in Florida and most Cuban Americans in Florida reside in the South Florida region. As a result, Cuban Americans consist of a miniscule percentage of the national population but dominate the demographic landscape of Miami-Dade County. Their overwhelming presence in Florida makes their political involvement critically important, particularly in presidential election years.

Figure 1: Population Estimates: Cubans, Other Hispanics, Non-Hispanics



Key Characteristics of the Cuban-American Population in Miami-Dade County

As Table 1 shows, the methodology utilized in conducting the 2022 FIU Cuba Poll resulted in a representative profile of the Cuban-American adult population in South Florida along multiple dimensions. The weighted sample percentages reflect estimates established by the U.S. Census Bureau in its 2016-2020, 5-year sample of the American Community Survey. Overall, we achieve an excellent representation of the demographics of the Cuban-American population in Miami-Dade County.

Table 1: Cuban Americans in Miami Dade County: Migration/Nativity, Age, Gender, Race (ACS and Cuba Poll Sample Estimates)

	ACS	Cuba Poll (weighted)
Nativity & immigrant cohort		
Born in Cuba		
Migrated before 1980	18.0	18.2
Migrated in 1980-1994	14.4	14.0
Migrated in 1995-2009	39.8	40.9
Migrated in 2010-2022	7.4	7.9
Born in the United States	18.4	17.1
Born in Other countries	1.9	1.8
Age group		
18-39	29.1	26.9
40-59	35.9	35.9
60-75	20.6	22.4
76 or older	14.4	14.8
Gender		
Male	48.5	53.9
Female	51.5	46.1
Race		
White	80.2	78.2
Black	1.5	2.3
Other	18.4	19.6
Years of education		
	12.6	14.4
	(3.5)	(3.0)

Note: The Cuba Poll results are weighted toward the ACS weighted population parameters using a four-way weight based on nativity, immigrant cohort, age, and gender.

Sources: 2022 FIU Cuba Poll; American Community Survey 2016-2020, 5-year sample.

Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County

Table 2 presents our estimate of the current number of registered Cuban Americans by party affiliation in Florida and Miami-Dade County. These numbers become relevant when voting preferences are disclosed. The charts that follow the table visually highlight the dominance of the Republican Party in Cuban-American political life at the state and the county levels.

Table 2: Estimated Number of Registered Cuban-American Voters by Party (Florida and M-D County)

	FLORIDA			MIAMI-DADE		
	All*	Hispanic**	Cuban***	All*	Hispanic**	Cuban***
Republican	5,233,366	676,826	379,224	433,113	325,853	256,482
Democrat	4,963,722	902,744	156,350	575,793	251,781	105,745
Other	4,7198,193	978,522	199,499	506,979	324,117	134,928
Total registered	14,395,281	2,558,092	735,073	1,515,885	901,751	497,155

Notes: * Official voter registration statistics as of August 31, 2022, retrieved on September 27, 2022.

** Official voter registration statistics as of July 25, 2022, retrieved on September 27, 2022.

*** Cuban estimates are based on American Community Survey 2016-2020, 5-year sample, 2022 Cuba Poll, and official voter registration statistics.

Figure 2: Estimated Florida Voter Registration by Party (by Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic)





Figure 3: Estimated Voter Registration by Party: Miami-Dade County (By Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic)




The Embargo and Economic Relations

Approximately 68% of Cuban Americans living in South Florida believe that the embargo has not worked.

Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the early 1990s, most Cuban Americans in South Florida have agreed: the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has not worked. The poll doesn't address the issue of what effectiveness would look like. That is, we don't ask directly what the respondents would consider to be a "successful embargo," so each respondent is free to evaluate success/failure on his or her own terms. This year is no exception to the rule. Sixty-eight percent of respondents acknowledge that the embargo has not worked. It is interesting to note that the newest arrivals (2015-2022) give the embargo's efficiency higher marks (49%).


Figure 4



A majority of the Cuban-American community supports the continuation of the embargo.

Support for the embargo remains high. Approximately 57% of the Cuban-American community supports, either strongly or mostly, the continuation of the U.S. embargo on the island when “Don’t Know” is considered a response. When a definitive opinion is expressed, 63% of respondents support the continuation of the embargo. Anti-embargo sentiments dominate only in the cohorts born outside of the island and those reporting to be registered Democrats.

Figure 5



Other Economic Relationships

A majority of Cuban Americans support the sale of food and medical products to Cuba by U.S. companies.

Despite the strong support for the economic embargo, Cuban Americans in South Florida are concerned about the welfare of their fellow Cubans on the island. This is clearly expressed in the overwhelming support for the exportation of food (Figure 6) and medicine (Figure 7) to the island. When respondents are asked if they support the sale of medicine or food by U.S. companies to Cuba in an “unrestricted way,” food exports by U.S. companies are supported by 64% of the sample and the export of medicine is endorsed by 72% of respondents.

Figure 6





Figure 7




The Politics of the Carrot and the Policy of the Stick

Does Cuba pose a threat to vital American interests? Most say, “yes.”

A majority of Cuban Americans (55%) consider Cuba to be a threat to vital American interests. The exception to this view is presented by the generation of Cubans born outside of Cuba, the newest arrivals, and those who are registered as Democrats.


Figure 8



Wielding the stick: a majority of respondents support policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change.

Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the 1990s, the desire to wield a punishing stick on the Cuban government while simultaneously extending some kind of conciliatory carrot has been present in the community’s attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations. Even though policies of the stick are the dominant approach, this ambivalent carrot/stick attitude is clearly seen in the two questions asking respondents to express their general policy preference. Asked in a non-specific manner, both approaches received overwhelming support. Seventy-four percent of respondents approved, in general, of policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government in order to promote regime change. All categories of respondents expressed overwhelming support for hardline policies.


Figure 9



Offering the carrot: a majority also support policies directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people.

Respondents are equally enthusiastic about policies designed to improve the well-being of the Cuban people. Overwhelming support is expressed for these “softer” political approaches (64%). Only registered Republicans express opposition, by a slim majority (52%) to this softer approach to U.S./Cuba policies.


Figure 10



On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations

Since President Barack Obama established diplomatic relations with Cuba, Cuban Americans have remained supportive of the new era in U.S./Cuba relations. There has been a steady retrenching of support for the policy since 2018, however, when 67% expressed support for the maintenance of diplomatic relations, as contrasted with the 53% support this year within the general population. What has become the status quo is opposed by those migrating before 1995, the oldest cohorts, and registered Republicans.

Figure 11



Strong disagreement with the restriction on the issuing of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

The recent announcement by the Biden administration that it will resume full immigration visa services in Havana next year will be welcomed by the vast majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida. Despite their ambivalent views on the maintenance of diplomatic relations, a near-consensus exists among Cuban Americans that the U.S. Embassy in Havana should provide immigrant visa services to Cubans wishing to travel to the United States. Eighty-two percent of respondents support the provision of visa services. (Figure 12)

Similar support is expressed for the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) program. Ninety-three percent of respondents support the program. (Figure 13)

Figure 12






Figure 13



Support for allowing all Americans unrestricted travel to the island remains split.

For the second consecutive poll, the Cuban-American community in South Florida is split on its support for initiating a policy allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to the island. Forty-seven percent of respondents expressed support for allowing all Americans to travel to the island, a figure unchanged from the 2020 poll. The younger population, those born outside of Cuba, registered Democrats, non-citizens and the post-2015 arrivals are the most eager to support opening travel to all U.S. citizens and residents.


Figure 14



A large majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have relatives or significant others living in Cuba.

The South Florida Cuban-American community has the characteristics of a true transnational diaspora. Many families on the island have experienced the migration of one or more of their members. Approximately 67% of Cubans living in South Florida have relatives living in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of those who migrated since 1995 have relatives left behind.


Figure 15



Many of the remaining relatives will eventually be our neighbors.

A strong majority of Cubans who have relatives on the island plan to bring them over at some point. Fifty-eight percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida with relatives on the island indicate that family reunification is on their minds.


Figure 16



Have you traveled to Cuba?

Over half of the respondents report traveling to the island at some point. Forty-six percent report never having traveled there at all. Most recent migrants are the most frequent travelers. Nearly 30% of Cuban Americans born outside of the island have made the journey to their parents' homeland.


Figure 17



Strong support for allowing U.S. airlines to all regions of the island, not only Havana.

The Biden administration's lifting of itinerary restrictions on U.S. airlines establishing routes to Cuba is strongly supported by the community. A strong majority of respondents are of the opinion that U.S. airline companies should be able to establish services throughout the island, not just to Havana. Approximately 71% of the community shares this opinion. A majority of all cohorts endorse the general support for expanding airline services beyond the capital.


Figure 18



Almost half of Cuban Americans send remittances to family members on the island.

Despite the inconveniences posed by the Trump administration’s restriction on remittances, which forced the highly efficient Western Union operations to leave the island, Cubans in South Florida continue to send remittances to friends and relatives. Close to half of all Cuban-American families send remittances to relatives in Cuba (47%). The most recent arrivals are the most likely to send remittances while the older population and the pre-1995 migrants are the least likely to do so. It’s worth mentioning that the most recent arrivals have fewer resources to contribute to relatives on the island but, nevertheless, a majority manages to share these resources with those left behind.


Figure 19



And a majority believe that Cuban Americans should be able to send as much money as they want to family and friends on the island.

When asked about their support for a policy allowing Cubans living in the United States to send as much money as they want to relatives and friends on the island, a majority of respondents expressed support for such an open-ended approach to remittances. The most recent arrivals and the non-Cuban born generations are the most supportive of not limiting the amount of remittances.

Figure 20




On Political Persuasion and National Issues

Yes, after all is said and done, Cubans are still conservative.

Most Cuban Americans consider themselves to be on the conservative side of political ideology. When asked to place their political views on a scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal, only Democrats cross into what might be called the “liberal” dimension of the ideological scale.

Figure 21




The importance of national policies to Cuban Americans in South Florida: the economy, health care, immigration, Cuba policies, gun control, Russia, China, race relations and abortion rights

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of selected social issues on a scale of 1-5. Each policy was presented independently. Respondents were not forced to prioritize the policies compared to each other, simply to rank the policy's importance on a five-point scale. The results present a clear picture of the importance of each policy. Combining the answers allows us to evaluate how the Cuban-American community prioritizes them. Let us look at the importance of each policy to the respondents categorized by age, migration period, and party registration.

Importance of National Issues by Age

The economy ranks as the most important policy concern among all respondent categories EXCEPT the oldest. The over-76 category of respondents considers health care the most important policy. The top three issues among the entire sample, as well as within each age cohort, are the economy, health care, and immigration. Cuba policy is ranked fourth by the entire sample but as low as eighth by the 18-39 cohort.


Figure 22



Importance of National Issues by Migration Period

Again, regardless of when the respondents left Cuba, the economy, health care, and immigration remain the most important issues facing Cuban Americans in South Florida. The economy edges out health care as the most important issue for Cuban Americans in South Florida. The government’s handling of Cuba policy remains in fourth place for the entire sample but slips to last place (ninth) when considered by Cuban Americans not born on the island. Abortion rights become significantly more important to Cuban Americans not born in Cuba.


Figure 23



Importance of National Issues by Voter Registration

The economy, health care, and immigration remain the most important issues for Cuban Americans, registered voters, and non-citizens alike. Health care is considered the most important issue to Democrats and non-citizens. Democrats also give great importance to abortion rights (2nd place), gun control and race relations. Cuba policy, clustered in fourth place with several issues when evaluated by all respondents, drops to eighth place in importance among Democrats.

Figure 24




Approval for Biden’s Handling of Key Issues

Biden receives little support for his handling of U.S./Cuba policy.

Cuban Americans, in general, are underwhelmed by the way that President Biden has handled U.S./Cuba policy. Only 28% support Biden’s handling of the issue. The most recent arrivals and registered Democrats are the only two categories that express majority support. Non-citizens, perhaps the most recently arrived of the group, are split in their support. It is impossible to tell from the responses how respondents disagree with Biden’s approach (whether too pro-engagement or too isolationist, for example).


Figure 25



Biden receives little support for his handling of U.S./China policy.

The respondents express slightly more support for the president’s handling of U.S./China policy than for his handling of Cuba policy. Approximately 30% approve of his China policy. Again, we find Democrats, the newest arrivals, and non-citizens cutting him the little slack that he gets from the Cuban-American community in South Florida on this issue.


Figure 26



Biden gets better marks for handling U.S./Russia relations

Biden improves his foreign policy approval rating marginally as it applies to Russia. Thirty-four percent of Cuban Americans support his handling of Russia policy. The lack of support varies across categories of respondents. Registered Democrats and the newest arrivals carry his approval water again.


Figure 27



Biden gets equally lukewarm support for his handling of the Ukraine crisis.

Thirty-eight percent of respondents support Biden’s handling of the Ukraine crisis. Only the cohort of registered Democrats expresses majority support for Biden on this issue, with the newest arrivals splitting evenly on their approval of the president.


Figure 28



Biden gets strong support for his handling of the Covid-19 crisis.

Approximately 56% of Cuban Americans in South Florida support the president’s handling of the Covid crisis. The main opposition comes from registered Republicans, 61% of whom do not support the president’s handling of the challenges posed by the pandemic.


Figure 29



Biden gets feeble support for his handling of the economy.

Registered Democrats are the only respondents who express strong support (62%) for the president's handling of the economy. The newest arrivals are the only other group that approaches a break-even point, with 48% expressing support for how the administration has handled the economy. All other respondent groups express disappointment in the administration's economic policy performance.


Figure 30



Biden’s overall approval rating is low among Cuban Americans in South Florida.

As of this writing, the polling gurus at FiveThirtyEight report a 42.7% approval rating for President Biden. This places him on par with President Trump and most other previous presidents going into the first midterm elections. This evaluation, however, does not hold true among Cuban Americans. When asked to evaluate President Biden’s overall job performance, 32% of Cuban Americans have a positive appraisal. The cohorts that express approval above that are, in order of approval, Democrats (73%), newest arrivals (64%), non-citizens (50%), the 76+ age cohort (40%), and the 60-75 age cohort (35%).


Figure 31



What to expect in November. High citizenship participation is a characteristic of the Cuban-American population.

The literature on Cuban Americans highlights their political engagement. Our sample lives up to those expectations. Figure 32 presents the percentage of Cuban Americans who are U.S. citizens. Only the wave of migrants who arrived during the past seven years, many of whom have not been in the country the necessary time to become citizens, lags behind in naturalization activity. All questions which follow about voting preferences exclude respondents who are non-citizens and are not registered (or indicate they have no intention of registering) to vote.


Figure 32



The Republican Party is the party of choice of a majority of registered Cuban voters and is replenishing itself with the energy of new arrivals.

While the ranks of the Republican Party are well represented by members of earlier migration waves (pre-1980), the newest arrivals are adding energy to the Republican presence in South Florida. The Democratic Party has made little headway into the Cuban-American community over the last few years (see Trends in Appendix 2), but the No-Party-Affiliation (Independent) category continues to attract close to a third of Cuban-American registered voters.


Figure 33



Cuban Americans are politically engaged and politically motivated to vote in upcoming elections.

Another measure of political engagement is the likelihood of registered voters to actually vote in the upcoming elections. Eighty-five percent of registered voters are committed to casting a ballot in November with another 11% reporting that they will “probably” vote in the upcoming elections. Republicans are somewhat more motivated than Democrats or Independents. The young voters are, as usual, the most ambivalent but this is a relative assessment since 80% percent express certainty about casting their ballot and an additional 16% see it as a probability.

Figure 34




The Horseraces

If the election for Florida governor were held today with Ron DeSantis and Charlie Crist as candidates, who would you vote for?

According to other polls, Gov. Ron DeSantis as an overwhelming favorite to win reelection in November. From 91% to 99.9% certainty of reelection with a 1/10 betting ratio in most scenarios. This is not a hard calculation to make given that Florida now has 5.2 million more registered Republicans than Democrats. Still, analysts will look closely at the “Cuban vote” and weigh its importance in the election since most Cubans live in Miami-Dade County, a county that is very close to breaking decades of voting tradition by transforming into a “purple” county. This apparent transition is being energized by Cuban Americans and other Latino voters.


Our poll completed its interviewing in mid-September. While the numbers might change by November, we can go out on a limb and call the Cuban-American vote for Ron DeSantis. Anywhere from 64% to 75% of Cuban Americans will cast their vote for Gov. DeSantis. There will be a small number of deserters from the Democratic ranks, but Cuban Americans registered as Democrats will back the Democratic candidacy of Charlie Crist (assuming that the Nikki Fried supporters don’t hold a grudge). The Democrats will also do well among Cuban Americans not born on the island, and among the youngest voters. But even the newest arrivals, who consistently expressed moderate views on the issues raised in our poll, are strongly behind DeSantis to the degree that the cohort is divided between DeSantis supporters and “undecided.” No respondent in the newest cohort expressed a desire to vote for a Democrat. But as has been the case in Florida for the last decade, the ultimate results of all political races will depend on voter turnout. The Democrats are motivated, and the odds might change because of this as we approach the election.



The Congressional races

Since much of the interviewing occurred before the party primaries held in August, the projected voting behavior of Cuban-American voters in Congressional races is difficult to estimate. In tallying the preferences of our respondents, it is clear from Figure 36, however, that the majority of Cuban-American voters are planning to vote for the Republican candidate on the ballot. This chart combines the voting commitments of the respondents along the three congressional races (Districts 26, 27 and 28). The large number of undecided voters hold some ephemeral hope for the Democratic candidate but committed Democratic voters are in a minority.

Figure 36




If the election for U.S. Senator were held today with Val Demings and Marco Rubio as candidates, who would you vote for?

The race for the U.S. Senate seat currently held by Sen. Marco Rubio is clearer, as evident by the small number of “undecided” voters. The two contenders are well-known political figures who have garnered attention for many months. Sixty-four percent of the Cuban-American voters report a clear preference for Sen. Rubio. The number of undecided voters (10%) is fairly small, given that all interviewers recorded their preferences two to three months before the election. Within the voter categories, however, we do see some variance from the general community pattern.

If we combine the number of respondents expressing support for Rep. Demings with the general support for “the Democrat” in the race, we can estimate the resistance to Sen. Rubio’s incumbency. The strongest support for Rep. Demings comes from the youngest voters (27%), the non-Cuban born (39%) and, of course, registered Democrats (72%). While no one is going to count the votes until all of Florida sings, it is clear that most Cuban-American voters are currently chanting Rubio’s name.


Figure 37



On the 2024 Presidential race which Republican would you like to see on the ballot?

When asked which Republican they would like to see on the ballot for U.S. president in 2024, it is clear that the Trump-train is still picking up passengers down 8th Street in Miami. Thirty-seven percent of respondents would like to see former President Trump back on the ballot. Twenty-one percent want to recruit Ron DeSantis. An impressive 59% of registered Republicans support Trump as do 25% of Independents (No Party Affiliation). Gov. DeSantis is a solid second in all cohorts. In fact, he approaches Trump in popularity among the youngest voters and surpasses him among the non-Cuban born respondents. Among the Democrats, he is in a tie with former Vice President Mike Pence as the preferred candidate. The large number of “DK” responses indicates the uncertainty of the electoral landscape.


Figure 38



The preferred Democratic candidate

When asked what Democratic candidate they would like to see on the ballot for U.S. president in 2024, Cuban Americans present a veritable kaleidoscope of possibilities. Ten percent of the entire sample expresses a preference for President Biden. He attracts 18% of 60–75-year-old respondents, 12% of voters born outside of Cuba, 13% of pre-1995 migrants and 17% of Democrats. The segmentation among Cuban-American Democrats might reflect the fragmentation within the party. Barack Obama ties (statistically) with President Biden as a preferred candidate among Democrats. Of course, the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution makes the drafting of Obama to be a candidate an impossibility. Non-Cuban born voters share this “enthusiasm” for former President Obama.

Figure 39



How much do “influencers” influence?

In recent years, the international phenomenon of “influencers” has become an evident socio-political force within the Cuban and Cuban-American virtual landscape. Using platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, the voices of these young, tech savvy entertainers often carry political messages to their growing audiences. We asked our respondents where they receive their information about Cuba. Approximately 37% of the entire sample mentioned that they received their information from social media sources. A clear generational and migration wave differentiation is evident in Figure 40. While only 4% of the oldest respondents report receiving information about Cuba from social media sources, 54% of the youngest respondents do so. Forty-seven percent of the most recent arrivals tune into social media sources for their information on Cuba as do those that have not yet become citizens (46%).

Figure 40





Figure 41 focuses on the political influence that social media personalities exert on the Cuban-American community. We asked those who reported receiving information from social media sources if they received information on Cuba from any specific internet personality. Several influencers were mentioned (Otaola, Los Pichy Boys, Ultrack, others). We then asked how much influence these sources had on their political thinking. Figure 41 shows that approximately 19% of the entire population report that “influencers” do indeed influence their political attitudes to some degree. The significance of social media personalities in the political sphere increases among the youngest respondents and the two waves of most recent arrivals. A fourth of these three cohorts report being influenced politically by social media influencers.

Figure 41




Lastly: On the Health and Economic Impact of Covid-19 on our Community

The impact of Covid-19 on the health of the community: muted but significant.

The COVID-19 crisis has had an impact on the health of the Cuban-American population in South Florida. Although the questionnaire does not explore the full impact of the virus in the community, over two-thirds (69%) of respondents report having their health and the health of their family affected (slightly, somewhat, badly or very badly) by the pandemic.


Figure 42



Economic impact due to COVID-19: broad and deep.

The financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is equally as widespread as its health impact. Sixty-nine percent of all respondents report being financially affected by the pandemic. The most vulnerable population seems to be non-citizens and the most recent arrivals.


Figure 43



Are you fully vaccinated, partially vaccinated or not vaccinated at all?

Most Cuban Americans received vaccines at some point during the lengthy Covid-19 pandemic. Seventy-two percent of respondents report being fully vaccinated with an additional 12% reporting being partially vaccinated. The response of the population (84% fully or partially vaccinated) exceeds estimates for the nation. The Centers for Disease Control report that as of Aug. 31, 2022, 79% of the U.S. population has received at least one dose of the vaccine.

Figure 44



DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It is never difficult to explain why Cuban Americans harbor non-conciliatory views about U.S./Cuba relations. There are as many reasons why Cuban Americans dislike the Cuban government as there are stars in the sky. Some Cuban Americans will catalogue the human rights violations to justify their opposition to lifting the embargo or otherwise normalizing economic and political relations with the island. Others will blame the Cuban government for its inefficient economic policies and the lack of transparency of its decision-making process and support playing hard political ball with a government that created the environment which forced them to leave their country. The hard line has many fathers and mothers and only the most calloused observer would brush it off as an irrational, emotion-driven world view.

So, when opinions which seemed to be trending in one direction suddenly veer onto a different path, and in a different direction, researchers become curious. Why did this happen? What new variables have entered the minds of our respondents?

The assumption has always been that the opinions of Cuban Americans shaped the policy decisions made by the leadership in Washington. Cuban Americans, after all, are constituents and, when it comes to Cuba, they are constituents with many horses in the race. Yet, the Obama years introduced new variables into the mix. When Obama opened diplomatic relations, travel and commercial engagement with the island, he did so without consulting the old political guard of Miami. As Pepe Hernandez, president of the Cuban American Foundation (CANF), explained, “Like they say in dominoes, they’ve been shuffled off the table quite substantially in the past few years but especially since Dec. 17, 2014.” (Mazzei, 2016). The CANF, under Jorge Mas Santos, supported the Obama move in a public statement (Mas Santos, 2008) and a detailed white paper, “A New Course for U.S. Cuban Policy: Advancing People-Driven Change” (CANF 2009). After limited protests against Obama’s opening, the community adjusted to the new normal. By the time Obama left office, over 64% of Cuban Americans supported the engagement initiatives. (FIU Cuba Poll 2020) The shift in community attitudes during the Obama years disrupted the hardline trend and initiated a trend towards diplomacy and engagement. This new trend shifted the attitudes of Cuban Americans from one of endorsing policies of isolation to at least considering policies of engagement. The shift in attitudes reflected the new normal established by Washington leadership.

Thirty years of conducting the FIU Cuba Poll provide

researchers with an ample data set to explore the “why” of such a dramatic shift in opinion. If we combine the data sets of the FIU Cuba Poll, an accumulation of data points of over 10,000 respondents back to the early 1990s, a compelling, previously unexplored pattern is evident. When we control for the influence of demographic, socioeconomic, birthplace, and immigrant cohort variables, that is, when we measure only the influence of the political party occupying the White House, a strong, unambiguous pattern emerges: leadership from Washington has a significant and direct influence on the views of Cuban Americans towards U.S./Cuba policy.

Exhibit A in this argument is the pattern established since the mid-1990s by the community’s support for the hot-button issue of the embargo. During the George H.W. Bush administration, 85% of Cuban Americans in South Florida supported the embargo. By 1995, two years into the Clinton administration, support was at 82%. From 1995 to 2000, however, even as the Helms-Burton Act made its way through a Republican Congress, the embargo endorsement rate declined by 3.6% per year — a total of 18 percentage points from 1995 to 2000. The George W. Bush years saw a stabilization of embargo support at the level reached during the Clinton years. Approximately 63% supported it at the beginning of the administration and 64% supported it at the end of his two terms.

During the Obama administration, support for the embargo resumed its decline by 2.6% per year. This resulted in a drop of 21 percentage points between 2008 and 2016. The ascension of Trump increased the rate of support for the embargo by 5.1% per year, yielding a rise of more than 10 percentage points in just two years. In short, whoever controls the White House shapes attitudes about Cuba among Cuban Americans in South Florida. Cubans, just like other Americans, take “cues” from their president.

The Obama approach did not change the anti-engagement minds in South Florida. The dislike of the Cuban government remained but the views about the strategies necessary to create change in Cuba were altered. As a moderate/right opponent of the Obama policies said, “Ok, so now we have to create a middle class in Cuba so that they will cause a problem for the government.”

So, bottom line, leadership matters.

The major conclusion drawn from this year's FIU Cuba Poll is that Cuban Americans are maintaining an attitude towards U.S./Cuba policy which mirrors the policy initiatives of the Biden administration. The Biden policy, to the extent that it exists, has maintained many of the characteristics established by the previous administration. The limited steps taken in recent months to alter travel and remittance restrictions and the projected resumption of family reunification initiatives are strongly supported by the Cuban-American community but are not new initiatives. The ambiguous approach to Cuba policy, however, seems to be reflected in the community's attitudes towards the continuation of diplomatic relations and in the ambiguous support of policies which promote regime change, as well as policies designed to improve the well-being of the Cuban people. Many supporters of the Obama initiatives have argued that only by establishing normal relations with the island can both of these objectives be met. As the analysis above shows, Cuban Americans in South Florida follow the lead of strong leadership in Washington, whether the leadership proposes engagement or isolation. A strong status quo bias seems to govern the attitudes of the community, and the status quo is established by Washington. Given the reluctance of the Biden administration to alter many of the Trump era policies and narratives, it is not surprising that Cuban Americans continue to express attitudes which reflect the status quo.

The tendencies evident in the results of the 2022 FIU Cuba Poll can be categorized into two broad camps: support for the Policies of the Stick and/or support for the Politics of the Carrot.

Policies of the Carrot

1. The support for certain policies that promote engagement and assistance to those on the island remains high, such as the selling of food and medicines.
2. While support for a policy of favoring unrestricted travel for all Americans has diminished, the support for airlines being allowed to fly to all regions of Cuba is strong.
3. In general terms, there is strong support for the development of policies addressing the well-being of the Cuban people.
4. Approximately half of Cuban Americans in South Florida have sent remittances to family members during the past year even though there are many obstacles without a simple "Western Union" solution in place.

The Policies of the Stick

1. Support for isolationist policies remains strong. Support for the embargo, for example, rose from the 2020 measurement (from 59% to 63%). Cuban Americans not born on the island are the least likely to support the continuation of the embargo (57% against its continuation).
2. Fifty-five percent of respondents feel that Cuba poses a threat to American interests.
3. Seventy-four percent support the implementation of policies that will exert maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change.

Views of existing policies

1. Cuban Americans support the resumption of consular services and the issuance of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
2. Cuban Americans support the resumption of the Family Reunification Parole Program.
3. Cuban Americans support allowing U.S. airlines to establish routes to cities throughout the island.

Cuban Americans on domestic politics

1. The economy, health care, and immigration are the three most important issues facing Cuban Americans today. Cuba policy, gun control and abortion rights shift in importance according to specific cohorts.
2. An energized and motivated Cuban-American voting public is ready to offer strong support to all Republicans on the ballot in the races for Florida governor, U.S. Senate and Congress.
3. President Biden has an overall favorable performance rating of 32% among Cuban Americans and receives unimpressive approval for his handling of major issues facing the nation. While the general Cuban-American population shows feeble approval of his performance so far, he does receive majority support from specific cohorts for his handling of Cuba policy, the Ukraine situation, and the Covid crisis.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Methodology

Following the methodology used in previous years, the 2022 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone survey of Cuban-American residents in South Florida. The intended population includes all self-identified Cuban adults (ages 18 or older) who currently live in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant LAN and cell numbers operating in the area. A probability sample was constructed using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure. As our previous polls have consistently favored older respondents due to their higher response rates, this survey assigned younger Cuban Americans higher probabilities to enter the sample. FIU contracted NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the interviews. The respondents who self-identified as Cuban were interviewed with our bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire and the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system.

Data collection took place between July 27 and Sept. 11, 2022. A total of 19,583 phone calls were made; among these, 15,501 refused to participate, and an additional 2,506 respondents were not of Cuban origin. Our final sample contained 1,000 eligible respondents. A majority (65.9%) of the sample completed the interviews via cell phone. Nearly half (41.7%) of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.

All results presented in this report are weighted to better represent the intended population. A four-way weight is constructed using gender, age, country of birth, and year of migration (if born in Cuba). Our population benchmark is the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2016-2020, 5-year sample. Our weight variable adjusts our sample composition toward all MDC Cuban residents ages 16 years or older in 2020.

All figures in this report are graphed using precise values, but most percentages are rounded to integers for visual clarity. As a result, the distributional percentages in a few figures do not add up to 100.


Table 2 presents the estimated number of Cuban-American registered voters by party. Two assumptions were made. First, the registration rate is assumed to be the same for all Hispanic communities (79.28% for Florida and 85% for MDC). Second, the state-level party distribution of Cuban-American registered voters is assumed to be the same as that in Miami-Dade County. Figures 2 and 3 are also built upon these assumptions.

Figures 42, 43, and 44 summarize the health and financial impacts of Covid-19, as well as vaccination status. Two and a half years into the pandemic, the current results contain an even greater survival bias than our 2020 poll. For instance, Figure 42 shows that older respondents are less affected by the pandemic in terms of health. This needs to be interpreted with caution. It is known that Covid-induced mortality is highly age-dependent, which means that many elderly Cubans whose health was most affected did not survive to our window of observation. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that our results reflect the situations of the surviving Cuban adult population in MDC.


Appendix 2: Selected Trends

Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2022)

Figure 45



Party Affiliation Over time (2007-2022)



Appendix 3: How Were The Questions Asked?

Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these policies.

1. **First, allow companies to sell medicine in an unrestricted way to Cuba. Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?**
[Esta es una pregunta sobre Cuba actualmente.] Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?
2. **Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba in an unrestricted way. Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?**
Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra?
3. **Allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose?**
Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no?
4. **Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all?**
En términos generales, ¿cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen resultado, no muy buen resultado, o ningún resultado?
5. **On the issue of the embargo, do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?**
¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba?
6. **On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba?**
¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?
7. **Some people say that the United States government should provide immigrant visa services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to Cubans trying to come to the United States. Do you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with this view?**
Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos debería proporcionar servicios de visa de inmigrante en la Embajada de los Estados Unidos en La Habana a los cubanos que intentan venir a los Estados Unidos. ¿Está decididamente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o fuertemente en desacuerdo con esta opinión?
8. **Do you agree or disagree that U.S. airline companies should be able to establish services to any region of the island, not just Havana. Do you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with this policy suggestion?**
Esta de acuerdo o no de acuerdo con que las compañías aéreas estadounidenses puedan establecer servicios en cualquier región de la isla, no solo en La Habana. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con esta recomendación?
9. **Do you or your family in Miami send money back to Cuba?**
¿Me podría decir si usted o algún miembro de su familia envía dinero a Cuba?
10. **Some people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change. Other people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that directly help the Cuban people improve their economic well-being. Thinking now about the policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government, do you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with this policy approach?**
Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno de los EE. UU. debe enfatizar las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano para promover el cambio de régimen. Otras personas dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos debe enfatizar las políticas que ayudan directamente al pueblo cubano a mejorar su bienestar económico. Pensando ahora en las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque de política?
11. **Thinking now about the policies that are directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people, do you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with this policy approach?**
Pensando ahora en las políticas que se dirigen específicamente a mejorar el bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque político?

About Florida International University

Florida International University is a top public university that drives real talent and innovation in Miami and globally. Very high research (R1) activity and high social mobility come together at FIU to uplift and accelerate learner success in a global city by focusing in the areas of environment, health, innovation, and justice. Today, FIU has two campuses and multiple centers. FIU serves a diverse student body of more than 58,000 and 290,000 Panther alumni. *U.S. News and World Report* places dozens of FIU programs among the best in the nation, including international business at No. 2. *Washington Monthly Magazine* ranks FIU among the top 20 public universities contributing to the public good.

About the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs

Launched in 2008, the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at FIU educates the leaders and changemakers of tomorrow through innovative teaching and research that advances global understanding, contributes to policy solutions and promotes international dialogue. One of the largest schools of its kind in the world, the Green School enrolls more than 5,700 students and employs 360 fulltime faculty. It offers 38 interdisciplinary degree programs at the bachelor's, master's and doctoral levels, as well as 54 undergraduate and graduate certificate programs. The Green School encompasses eight signature departments: Criminology and Criminal Justice, Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages, Politics and International Relations, Public Policy and Administration and Religious Studies. Home to 17 of the university's most prominent international centers, institutes and programs, the Green School is a member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).

About the Cuban Research Institute

FIU's Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is the nation's premier center for research and academic programs on Cuban and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the number of professors and students of Cuban origin.

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